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Nietzsche’s Compassion
Abstract: Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly 
rendered as “compassion”). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also 
seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compas-
sion” and contrasts it with “your compassion” (BGE 225). Some commentators have 
interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may 
seem – that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that 
even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he 
regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest 
that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant impli-
cations for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, 
for Nietzsche, “our compassion,” however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give 
occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into “co-suffering” with others, which in 
turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche 
objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now 
call “anticipatory empathy.” Even though a large body of literature has evolved over 
Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compas-
sionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive 
more attention.
Keywords: Mitleid, Compassion, Anticipatory empathy, Suffering, Schopenhauer
 To the memory of İhsan Akev–a great teacher, opera singer, and human being
Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered 
as “compassion”).1 He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems 
1 David E. Cartwright, “Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity,” Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 
69 (1988), 557–67: 557, argues that Nietzsche’s conception of Mitleid should be understood exclusively 
as “pity,” rather than “compassion,” which is what Schopenhauer’s Mitleid is all about. What this 
reading implies is that since compassion is different from pity, Schopenhauer’s account of Mitleid is 
immune to Nietzsche’s extensive polemic. Cartwright remarks: “despite the correctness of Nietzsche’s 
critique of Mitleid [i.  e., Mitleid as pity], the reasons he uses to criticize Schopenhauer’s Mitleids-Moral 
[i.  e., the morality of compassion] fail. […] this paradoxical situation results because Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche refer to two different emotions by the German noun Mitleid.” One major drawback of 
Cartwright’s reading is that his solution to this allegedly paradoxical situation comes at the expense 
of charging Nietzsche of equivocating on his use of Mitleid. But far more serious than that, this reading 
implies that Nietzsche did not really understand Schopenhauer’s Mitleid. But this is an implausible, 
as well as uncharitable, interpretation of Nietzsche’s intention, since he launches his strongest ob-
jections to the moral ideal of shared suffering, i.  e., the suffering in response to the other’s woe, and 
its afflicting and enfeebling effects on the compassionate person. To claim that Schopenhauer and 
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to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and 
contrasts it with “your compassion” (BGE 225).2 Some commentators have interpreted 
Nietzsche talk pass each other regarding the issue of Mitleid is tantamount to claim that Nietzsche 
was deeply confused, and in the grip of a mistaken understanding of Schopenhauer’s moral theory. 
According to Gudrun von Tevenar, “Nietzsche’s Objections to Pity and Compassion,” in Gudrun von 
Tevenar (ed.), Nietzsche and Ethics, Bern 2007, 263–81: 268, “Nietzsche’s objections are almost ex-
clusively concerned with Mitleid understood as pity and not as compassion.” More specifically, she 
argues that “Zarathustra feels Mitleid merely as pity while the deeply sad agent [in GM III 14] feels 
what Nietzsche calls ‘great Mitleid’, which we can now confidently translate as compassion” (275). 
I think that Tevenar is misreading and overemphasizing certain features of Nietzsche’s critique, or 
making too much of Nietzsche’s concern that Mitleid may at times be stained by attitudes of conde-
scension and contempt that are characteristic of pity. Although Tevenar can argue that she is being 
interpretatively consistent, this line of reading does not reflect Nietzsche’s conception of Mitleid ac-
curately either. For one thing, her commentary on Zarathustra’s philanthropic attitude and charitable 
disposition (in Z II, On the Pitying) indicates that she confuses bestowing virtue with Mitleid (273). 
Tevenar correctly observes, however, that, for Nietzsche, “while the effects of pity can be wiped away, 
the effects of compassion cannot” (275). But if Zarathustra feels Mitleid merely as pity and the effects 
of such feeling can be discarded without much effort, then it is unclear why Nietzsche painstakingly 
depicts Zarathustra as being confronted with a strenuous task of overcoming Mitleid. This reading 
also disregards a key component of the story, i.  e., Zarathustra’s encounter with the Soothsayer who 
tempts Zarathustra to succumb to the sin of Mitleid. The figure of soothsayer is possibly a reference 
to Schopenhauer. One would only expect Schopenhauer to tempt Zarathustra to display an emotion 
that he deems the most important of all, i.  e., Mitleid as compassion for others, not pity. Here is what 
John Richardson, Nietzsche’s Values, New York 2020, 268–69, has to say on this subject: “Nietzsche’s 
word is Mitleid, which says ‘suffering with’. We face an immediate choice whether to translate is ‘pity’ 
or ‘compassion’. The latter reflects (in Latin) the structure of Nietzsche’s word, but it connotes to me 
something more high-toned and rare than I think he usually means. It connotes a degree of empathy 
and identification with the other that is not usual. So it may not aptly apply to many of the ordinary 
cases he diagnoses. I think ‘pity’ is a better label for the very common attitude he has mostly in mind. 
And Nietzsche will insist that those high-toned cases are just variations on the common attitude. The 
difference is just a matter of degree; they share the same structure. So they both count as Mitleid for 
him.” Commentators, even influential ones such as John Richardson, continue to misunderstand and 
misrepresent Nietzsche’s Mitleid. In ‘pity’, the (pathos) of distance between the subject and the pitied 
is maintained, thus one only feels for the plight of the pitied. However, and this points out a crucial 
difference, in “compassion,” one recognizes the other’s suffering as one’s own, thus one feels with the 
sufferer. So, contra to Richardson’s claim, for Nietzsche, the difference between “compassion” and 
“pity” is not just a matter of degree nor do they share the same structure. Nietzsche is well aware of 
these nuances, therefore it is in my view quite wrong to suggest that Nietzsche’s use of the term Mitleid 
does not distinguish between “compassion” and “pity.” My own approach to translation is guided by 
what I think a straightforward and intuitive principle: the choice of translation should pay attention to 
the contextual clues in a given text. That being said, taking into account the context of those passages 
quoted in this paper, the English word “compassion” is used to translate the German Mitleid, literally 
“suffering with.”
2 I mostly use the following translations of Nietzsche’s works. However, where matters of nuance are 
at issue, I rely on my own translation of the texts. BGE: trans. Adrian Del Caro, Stanford, CA 2014; D: 
trans. Brittain Smith, Stanford, CA 2011; EH: trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York 2000; GM: trans. Wal-
ter Kaufmann, New York 1969; GS: trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York 1974; HH: trans. Gary Handwerk, 
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this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem – that 
he does not condemn compassion entirely. To the contrary, Nietzsche allows for and 
encourages healthy expressions of compassion, which are active, not only increas-
ing one’s sense of psychological power, but more so modifying and bringing about 
beneficial (and creative) changes to one’s surroundings. I disagree and contend that 
even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he 
regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest 
that Nietzsche’s discussion of different forms of compassion has significant impli-
cations for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, 
for Nietzsche, “our compassion,” however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give 
occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into “co-suffering” with others, which in turn 
results in overcoming compassion entirely. Nietzsche interprets this unique experi-
ence as the way to achieve greatness, and therefore calls it “the ultimate test” or the 
“real proof of strength” (EH, Why I Am so Wise 4).
This paper adheres to the following plan. In Section 1, I demonstrate that 
Nietzsche takes compassion in all its forms to be bad in some fundamental way. In 
Section 2, I elaborate on Nietzsche’s claim about the essentially bad nature of com-
passion through his observations on ancient moralities. In Section 3, I turn to the 
passages where Nietzsche approves of something that he presents as a different kind 
of compassion. Some commentators appeal to these passages as proof that Nietzsche 
is not entirely against compassion and actually approves of some form of compas-
sion. I argue that compassion, even in its most compelling form, as characterized by 
commentators, is not a good for Nietzsche, because he considers it to be fundamen-
tally bad for human beings as creators. In Section 4, I argue that the ultimate goal 
of “our (Nietzschean) compassion” is to prepare those creators that hold the key to 
human greatness for the ultimate test, which is the overcoming of all compassion. In 
Section 5, I discuss the ethical implications of overcoming compassion. I argue that 
although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist the-
orists might now call “anticipatory empathy.” I then conclude by highlighting some 
of the basic features of this distinct type of empathy. In the sixth and final section, I 
briefly consider the possibility of channeling our compassion into the enhancement of 
human life. As a side note regarding the scope of this paper, even though a large body 
of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his un-
derstanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather over-
looked and should receive more attention. I believe my reconstruction of Nietzsche’s 
discussion of his brand of compassion opens up many possible avenues of research 
on his moral psychology and ethical thought.
Stanford, CA 1995; TI: trans. Judith Norman, Cambridge 2005; Unpublished Fragments from the Period 
of Human, All Too Human II [= UFHH], trans. Gary Handwerk, Stanford, CA 2013; Unpublished Frag-
ments from the Period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Summer 1882–Winter 1883/84) [= UFZ], trans. Paul S. 
Loeb and David F. Tinsley, Stanford, CA 2019; Z: trans. Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge 2006.
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1  The Essentially Injurious Nature of Compassion
Nietzsche wrote about the value of compassion frequently. His focus is particularly on 
Mitleid as compassion, in the Schopenhauerian sense of acknowledging, identifying 
with, and sharing in the sufferings of others. Nietzsche declares in his 1883 notebook 
he kept while writing Zarathustra (1883–1885) that “an abyss called ‘compassion’ is my 
danger.” And he adds in the same place: “The danger for superhumans is compassion. 
Let us avoid giving them compassion!” (Nachlass 1883, 13[1], KSA 10.442, UFZ 393 and 
396) In an 1883 letter to the writer and friend Malwida von Meysenbug, Nietzsche ex-
presses his concern as follows:
Schopenhauerian “compassion” [das Schopenhauerische “Mitleiden”] has always instigated the 
main mischief in my life–and therefore I have every reason to be well-meaning toward such 
moralities that include in morality a few other motivating forces and do not reduce all our human 
capacities to “fellow feeling” [“Mitgefühle”]. This is not just a softness that any great-minded 
Hellene would have laughed at, but also a serious practical danger. One should enforce one’s 
own ideal of human being, one should, with his ideal, force and overpower one’s fellow human 
beings as oneself: and thus act creatively! But to do this, one needs to hold one’s compassion in 
strong check (Mid July 1883, no. 437, KSB 6.404; my translation).
At this juncture, three questions force themselves upon us. First, what does Schopen-
hauerian compassion involve? Second – a question that is central to understanding 
Nietzsche’s problematizing of the value of compassion – what is the danger, Nietzsche 
thinks, associated particularly with Schopenhauerian compassion, i.  e., the danger 
posed by it to one’s well-being? Third, how exactly does this danger in turn affect our 
interaction and relationships with others? This is not a question of lesser significance; 
after all, compassion is an interpersonal process, which involves attending to anoth-
er’s negative state with a desire to reduce this distress. These questions are interre-
lated, and we find some initial answers to them within Nietzsche’s middle writings.
In D 134, titled The Extent to which One Must Guard Against Compassion, Nietzsche 
sees giving into compassion as a form of “loss of self to an injurious affect [Sich-ver-
lieren an einen s c h ä d i g e n d e n  Affect].” In D 137, he proceeds to implicitly criticize 
Schopenhauer’s characterization of compassion. According to Schopenhauer, when 
feeling compassion, we immediately transcend the constraints of our self and share 
another’s suffering “precisely in his person,”3 “despite the fact that his skin does not 
enclose [our] nerves.”4 In Nietzsche’s understanding, this is objectionable because 
compassion requires one to risk one’s own suffering to alleviate the sufferings of 
others. In other words, in compassion, we must “suffer from our ego and simultane-
ously from the ego of the other, and […] thereby voluntarily overburden ourselves with 
3 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals,” in The Two Fundamental Problems of 
Ethics, trans. and ed. Christopher Janaway, Cambridge 2009, 113–258: 203.
4 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals,” 218.
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a doubled irrationality instead of making the load of our own as light as possible” (D 
137). Hence, Nietzsche thinks that compassion, as characterized by Schopenhauer, 
creates unnecessary suffering; it involves a spontaneous, intense emotional distress 
felt when confronted with another’s negative state or situation, which is inherently 
pathological because such opening up to another’s suffering depletes one’s emotional 
and physical energy, which may leave the individual feeling feeble and somewhat 
passively indignant. Even worse, through such depletion, one may eventually “come 
to mistrust any ‘meaning’ in suffering, indeed in existence” (Nachlass 1886/87, 5[71], 
KSA 12.212; trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale). Filling oneself up with others’ misfor-
tunes, one becomes preoccupied with the question: “What is the point of suffering?” 
(Nachlass 1887, 8[2], KSA 12.327; my translation) Grappling with the meaning of suffer-
ing and accompanying pessimism in turn stands in the way of our self-realization and 
saps us of our joy for life. Therefore, the stronger one’s susceptibility to compassionate 
impulses, the stronger the feelings of depletion and mental-emotional exhaustion.
On the other hand, because humans are also endowed with the capacity to take 
a source of distress and transform it into a source of pleasure, the detrimental effects 
of empathic distress can be to some extent masked and overlooked if not obliterated. 
Nietzsche warns against the recurrent tendency to drain one’s creative energies and 
resources solely in the service of others by way of blindly indulging in the self-forget-
ting pleasures of compassion. Specifically, Nietzsche points out, in compassion, we 
automatically and unconsciously try to override the effects of psychological depletion 
by “surrendering to an impulse for pleasure.” Pleasure arises in various forms:
in the very idea of being able to help […], in the thought of praise and gratitude were we to help, 
in the very activity of helping insofar as the act is successful and succeeds step by step, thus 
allowing the performer to delight in himself, but especially in the sensation that our action has 
put an end to an injustice that arouses our indignation (already the release of indignation in 
itself is invigorating) (D 133).
In other words, we are typically motivated by another’s distress to help, but in signif-
icant ways, we also gain our altruistic motivation from pleasure. Nietzsche holds this 
way of deriving pleasure from compassionate behavior in low estimation in contrast 
to the pleasure that one gains from being creative or from fostering and enabling cre-
ativity, i.  e., “the pleasure in creating and in the thing created” (Nachlass 1886/87, 7[2], 
KSA 12.253; trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale).
Additionally, and equally problematic, is that the psychological depletion caused 
by the perception of and immediate affective participation in another’s suffering in 
turn limits one from effectively comprehending the feelings and perspective of the 
person suffering and thereby using one’s empathy in genuinely benevolent ways to 
increase human flourishing. Nietzsche urges us to be cautious with respect to com-
passion, for “it lames [the individual] in all decisive moments and paralyzes his 
knowledge and his benevolent delicate hand” (D 134). In this connection Nietzsche 
carefully emphasizes that while there may be instrumental reasons for acting on our 
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compassionate impulses insofar as doing so will occasionally contribute to the benefit 
of those in distress, such instrumental justifications for compassionate action effec-
tively ignores what is fundamentally bad about compassion, i.  e., its essentially inju-
rious nature.5 I will return to this point and consider it in more detail in Section 3.
2  Reflecting on the Problem of the Value of 
 Compassion through Ancient Moralities
The ancients, Nietzsche contends, remained on guard against being driven by a spon-
taneous, all-encompassing concern for others. Nietzsche draws on ancient moralities 
to oppose Schopenhauer’s overemphasis on the moral value of compassion. One his-
torical example Nietzsche offers is drawn from the ancient Stoic culture, where the 
altruistic potential of empathy and its moral dimension is simply disregarded:
What a shift there has been in the whole panoply of moral judgments! Those greatest marvels 
of antique morality, Epictetus, for example, had no concept of the now common glorification of 
thinking about others or of living for others; according to our moral fashion, we would have to 
brand them downright immoral, for they fought with all their might for their ego and against 
empathy with others (particularly with the suffering and moral frailties of others) [die Mitemp-
findung mit den Anderen (namentlich mit deren Leiden und sittlichen Gebrechen)]. Perhaps they 
would reply to us: “If to your own selves you are such boring or loathsome objects, go right ahead 
and think of others more than yourselves. You’re doing the right thing by it.” (D 131)
Here Nietzsche’s main observation is that empathy, and in particular compassionate 
empathy, is a nonexistent concept in ancient Greek thought. Another example con-
cerns the Roman attitude to empathic concern:
A compassionate action [Eine mitleidige Handlung], for example, was considered neither good 
nor bad, neither moral nor immoral, in the best period of the Romans; and even when it was 
praised, such praise was perfectly compatible with a kind of indignant contempt as soon as it 
was placed together with an action that served the well-being of the whole, of the res publica 
(BGE 201; my translation).
So far from being perceived as a moral phenomenon, acting in a caring way and ex-
pressing sensitivity for others’ distress was frowned upon by the Romans. The classicist 
David Konstan also claims that neither empathy nor compassion (Mitleid) has a direct 
terminological equivalent in Greek and Roman antiquity. More specifically, while 
there are, for instance, in ancient Greek, words that are morphologically analogous to 
5 Nietzsche speaks of failed attempts to justify “compassion’s essential nature, which is, as stated, 
injurious” (D 134).
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Mitleid such as “sunalgein (‘feel pain with’), sullupeisthai, sunakhthesthai (‘feel pain 
or grieve with’), and sumponein (‘struggle or toil with’),” these terms simply signify a 
contagious sharing of others’ distress, not the perception and comprehension of an-
other’s emotional or psychological state.6 Thus, Konstan notes, “[n]ot even these com-
pound terms, then, indicate the kind of emotional fusion that modern coinages such 
as empathy imply.”7 Note also that here we see Nietzsche repeating the same concern 
about the phenomenon of self-loss through compassion. With his imagined reply of 
a stoic critic, he seems to convey the idea that when one has a tendency for attentive-
ness to others’ distressing situations and spontaneous helping behavior, one always 
runs a certain risk of losing one’s way and forfeiting one’s goals. This is, however, only 
an aspect of the “serious practical danger” that Nietzsche speaks of in his letter to 
Meysenbug, namely, the psychological weakness and self-loss elicited by one’s strong 
susceptibility to the sufferings of others. The other danger concerns the extent of our 
emotional engagement with the experiential states of others. Nietzsche cautions us 
against it when he tells us that the ancients disdain any display of heightened sensi-
tivity to the sufferings of others, especially when such sensitivity involves making a 
greater commitment to others and the common good. Compassionate actions based 
on the motivation of putting others before oneself carries with them the risk of losing 
sight of one’s potential for self-growth and self-creation and thereby undermining 
one’s progress toward achieving the ideal of human greatness. If one habitually tends 
“to run from the ego […] and to live in others, for others” (D 516), then one likely lacks 
a strong sense of appreciation and understanding of oneself and thereby the kind of 
attitudes and goals that are necessary for the fulfillment of creative potentials. But if 
that is so, then one is simply not in a position to form one’s own ideal of human great-
ness and effectively inculcate it in others in order to empower them to flourish. In the 
following section, I will elaborate in detail how exactly, Nietzsche thinks, compassion 
thwarts creative potentials and personal growth in self and others, and his attempt to 
overcome this issue by presenting what he calls a different kind of compassion.
3  Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Compassion
Nietzsche regards compassion as, in its “essential nature,” “injurious,” “a weakness,” 
or, “as with the Greeks, a pathological recurring affect, the danger of which one can 
remove by temporary, voluntary discharges” (D 134). Compassion is essentially in-
jurious because compassionate tendencies mislead individuals about the value and 
necessity of suffering. By itself, suffering is no gateway to greatness. Rather, it is one’s 
6 David Konstan, Pity Transformed, London 2001, 58.
7 Konstan, Pity Transformed, 60.
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attitude toward suffering and the potential instilled therein, or what one does with 
suffering, that matters. One cannot develop a certain attitude towards one’s own suf-
fering  – its nature or potential  – if one looks out and away from one’s self to the 
other. This is what Nietzsche labels as “self-forgetting,” and it is not surprising to find 
that he also considers certain forms of self-forgetting entirely injurious. The kind of 
self-forgetting that results from focusing on the good of others, for Nietzsche, may 
result in a self-loss (or self-deflation) that is marked by thinking of one’s own benefit 
less frequently and sometimes even giving up one’s goals and independence in order 
to meet the needs of others. This experience is, for Schopenhauer, allegedly illuminat-
ing because it offers insight into metaphysical oneness with others, characterized as 
renouncing one’s self-identity, forming one body with others, and ultimately viewing 
them as one’s own self. However, for Nietzsche, the self-forgetting associated with 
compassionate feelings is deeply troubling. Even God forgets himself to the point of 
completely identifying with and drowning in the sufferings of humanity, a passionate 
forgetfulness of self that ultimately leads to his death. Therefore, Zarathustra warns us 
by quoting the devil’s words, “God is dead; God died of his compassion for mankind” 
(Z II, On the Pitying; my translation).
Indulging in strong empathic affects and their associated self-forgetting feelings, 
as Nietzsche contends, tends to gradually and subtly disassociate the person from his 
growth and character building, misleading him into the belief that “the individual’s 
happiness as well as his sacrifice consist in feeling himself to be a useful member and 
tool of the whole” (D 132). Here of particular concern to Nietzsche is also the psychol-
ogy behind such self-forgetting behavior, or as he calls it, the tendency “to lose one’s 
own way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor” (GS 338). He believes that 
the compassionate motive to benefit others is an excuse to take pause from one’s la-
borious path to greatness, which seems to betray the ideal of self-actualization, even if 
the agent may not experience it as such. Our conspicuous compassion is most often a 
symptom of a lack of self-love and worthiness. As Nietzsche says through Zarathustra 
in his speech to those who seek to have selfless, compassionate love for others: “You 
flee to your neighbor to escape yourself and you want to make a virtue of it: but I see 
through your ‘selflessness’,” and he points out that “your love of the neighbor is your 
bad love of yourselves” (Z I, On Love of the Neighbor). There is always a temptation 
to give up the ideal of self-actualization, and this apparent deviation from the path 
of will to power remains one of the psychological mysteries of human motivation for 
Nietzsche: “our ‘own path’ is too hard and demanding and too far from the love and 
gratitude of others, – we are not at all unwilling to escape from it, from our own con-
science, and take refuge in the conscience of others and the lovely temple of the ‘reli-
gion of compassion’” (GS 338; my translation).
However, self-forgetfulness is not always and necessarily regrettable. There are 
healthy expressions of self-forgetfulness that must be distinguished from the kind that 
Nietzsche finds pernicious. A willingness to drift from one path to another, to venture 
into risky territories as a way of exerting one’s physical-psychological potential 
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without the fear of self-immersion in sensation and experience is the most resounding 
expression of “the unexhausted begetting will of life,” i.  e., the most vital sign of the 
excess of life and thereby greatness (Z II, On Self-Overcoming). Therefore, Zarathustra 
proclaims: “I love the one whose soul is overfull, so that he forgets himself” (Z I, Pro-
logue 4). One must learn to take one’s sufferings lightly and allow them to be a means 
of encouragement and strength to the self, and at times even to derail oneself from 
one’s purpose for the sake of teaching one about the painful manifestations and lower 
aspects of human nature. Nietzsche speaks highly of the ability to endure emotionally 
and physically destructive experiences that is necessary for creative, noble, and re-
lentless transformation of the self, which in turn depends on the practice of a peculiar 
form of self-forgetfulness. Nietzsche describes such forgetfulness as not being able to 
take one’s misfortunes and suffering seriously for very long (GM I 10).
Compassion with its excessive concern with suffering dismisses and goes against 
the most fundamental lesson of life–the insight that life necessitates changes in all di-
rections, including both increases and decreases in amplitude, and sometimes inter-
ventions in one’s path of self-cultivation. It is in line with this insight that Nietzsche, 
through Zarathustra, tells us an unambiguously cautionary tale about the heightened 
sensitivity to suffering that compassion presupposes. In the final analysis, Zarathus-
tra comes to the recognition that his suffering and compassion actually do not matter 
since he has chosen a life centered around the ideals of self-discovery and creativity 
(Z IV, The Sign).
In the absence of a discussion of a positive alternative, Nietzsche’s sharp critique 
naturally leads us to the conclusion that he rejects compassion in all of its forms. 
However, some of Nietzsche’s later writings suggest that compassion per se is not ob-
jectionable but only certain expressions of compassion. In BGE 225, Nietzsche intro-
duces a contrast between “our compassion [u n s e r  Mitleid]” and “your compassion 
[e u e r  Mitleid].” He claims that excessive empathic involvement in others’ distress-
ing situations and emotional experiences saps our strength and gets in the way of 
human flourishing by dragging us into a sort of passive and inert existence without 
action-stirring ideals. Hence, Nietzsche, in an unpublished fragment, warns us of how 
habituating oneself to empathic affects is fraught with the danger of depriving oneself 
of the ambitions of acquisition of higher values: “It is a relief to count oneself the same 
as others, to try to feel as they do, to adopt a current feeling: it is something passive 
compared with the activity that maintains and constantly practices the individual’s 
right to value judgments (the latter allows of no rest)” (Nachlass 1886/87, 7[6], KSA 
12.274; trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale). “Your compassion,” Nietzsche says (to the 
Schopenhauerian), wants to put an end to all suffering, and hopes that doing so will 
achieve an overall state of social well-being, greater ease and safety without risk to 
life, which only ends up significantly narrowing the scope of creative human activ-
ity. Because it is not concerned with the context in which a particular suffering (of a 
particular person) takes place, “your compassion” fails to recognize what suffering 
may carry in it, i.  e., the promise for growth. Thus, by unconditionally giving in to 
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“your compassion,” you are withdrawn from the human possibility of enduring and 
overcoming suffering and thereby from the creative and form-giving aspects of human 
life.
“Your compassion,” according to Nietzsche, neglects that suffering sometimes 
affords the most valuable of all known means of personal flourishing. It is not part of 
my present endeavor to defend Nietzsche’s views on the value or meaning of suffer-
ing.8 For the purposes of this paper, I am confining my discussion to how compassion 
tends to demonize suffering, render it devoid of purpose, and therefore meaningless, 
rather than to see it as something both conducive and even necessary to achieving 
certain great human goods. One of the main benefits Nietzsche sees in suffering is 
its disciplining effect. Suffering, in the form of discipline, can mold the character by 
enabling a redemptive process in which one can combat and overcome excessive or 
pathological sensitivity to painful stimuli. As a second benefit, intense suffering, in 
some cases, may produce a transformative tension and a desire to resolve that tension. 
The latter in turn instigates a process of interpretive sense making that opens the in-
dividual to an overabundance of meaning and potential that is intimately connected 
with the process of reaching towards one’s higher self and maintaining a renewed 
sense of purpose and vigor in life.
Now, to clarify Nietzsche’s position here, he is aware that suffering does not 
always lead to great things in the end. Although he states, via Zarathustra, that creat-
ing “is the great redemption from suffering” and “in order for the creator to be, suffer-
ing is needed and much transformation” (Z II, On the Blessed Isles), not all suffering is 
creative and redemptive in character. Hence, albeit in a different context, Zarathustra 
tells us: “There is no redemption for one who suffers so from himself, unless it were 
the quick death” (Z I, On the Pale Criminal). Granted that, indeed, some suffering is 
apparently senseless, and “[w]hat causes indignation against suffering is not suffer-
ing in itself, but the meaninglessness of suffering” (GM II 7). Yet, we have the ability 
to reflect on our attitudes to suffering “by changing the effect that it has on our sensi-
bility: that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as something good [durch ein Umdeuten 
des Uebels in ein Gut] whose utility will perhaps only later become visible” (HH I 108). 
Instead of seeing suffering as something to be avoided or minimized, Nietzsche sug-
gests, we can benefit by seeing suffering as a potential catalyst for future greatness, 
as character building and therefore desirable. However, the usefulness of suffering is 
ultimately determined by one’s attitude to suffering and life overall. The main point 
that Nietzsche is trying to make here is rather subtler. Our consistent effort to culti-
vate a culture of compassion with its overemphasis on the apparent senselessness or 
badness of suffering not only perpetuates the problem about human flourishing in the 
long run, but it also, and perhaps paradoxically, creates more passive suffering for hu-
8 For a good discussion on this point, see Christopher Janaway, “On the very Idea of ‘Justifying 
Suffering’,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (2017), 152–70.
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manity by preventing us from exploring and exploiting the particularity and creative 
potential of suffering. With its orientation toward the goal of abolishing suffering by 
whatever means necessary, “your compassion” only imposes on the individual a prac-
tically and psychologically implausible demand, as if there exists a universal solution 
to the question of suffering. So, Keith Ansell-Pearson correctly observes that there is 
“[a] concern that in extolling compassion as the panacea to our moral anxieties we are 
in danger of existing as fantasists.”9 What we need in the end, Nietzsche proposes, 
is to fine-tune or reverse the direction of compassion’s orientation, toward the goal of 
creation and accomplishment. It is in this context that Nietzsche presents and extols 
an apparently different kind of compassion.
On the basis of Nietzsche’s favorable remarks on “our compassion,” several com-
mentators have concluded that Nietzsche is not entirely against Mitleid or compas-
sion and actually approves of a kind of compassion that does not come in conflict 
with our dedication to the promotion of creativity and greatness. It seems worthwhile 
to review some of the commentaries on the issue. Robert Hilmar Haraldsson claims 
that Nietzsche “emphasizes that there is a different kind of Mitleid which he sees as 
valuable and wants to associate his name with.”10 Marinos Diamantides announces 
Nietzsche as “the philosopher of compassion par excellence.”11 In a negative sense, 
Nietzsche criticizes compassion and its effects on our culture, how, along the way, 
it has prevented us from developing a deep, contextual appreciation of suffering–
that certain forms of suffering are good for us and should be allowed to dwell within 
us. However, “[i]n a positive sense,” Diamantides claims, “Nietzsche remains the 
philosopher of affirmative compassion in word and in deed.” Michael Ure similarly 
draws our attention to Nietzsche’s call for “active compassion towards the suffering 
[individual].”12 Daniel I. Harris argues that while Nietzsche is against the attempt to 
relieve suffering indiscriminately, he “maintains a place for a particularized attention 
to suffering.”13 According to Harris, “Nietzsche […] criticizes one sort of compassion 
while also holding open the possibility of healthier forms of shared suffering to be 
encouraged.”14 In his The Affirmation of Life, Bernard Reginster remarks: “Although 
some scholars continue to maintain that Nietzsche’s revaluation of compassion is a 
9 Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Beyond Compassion: On Nietzsche’s Moral Therapy in Dawn,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 44 (2011), 179–204: 185.
10 Robert Hilmar Haraldsson, The Problem of Mitleid and the Morality of Mitleid: A Reading of 
Nietzsche on Morality [Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Publication No. 9821251], Pitts-
burgh, PA 1997.
11 Marinos Diamantides, “Law’s Ignoble Compassion,” in Peter Goodrich / Mariana Valverde (eds.), 
Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-written Laws, New York 2005, 89–103: 97.
12 Michael Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works, Lanham, MD 2008, 208.
13 Daniel I. Harris, “Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (2017), 
17–28: 24.
14 Harris, “Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche,” 18.
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wholesale rejection of it, this interpretation is no longer tenable.”15 “For one thing,” 
Reginster points out, “we can no longer ignore that Nietzsche clearly advocates certain 
forms of compassion and benevolence.” In his Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, 
Antoine Panaïoti offers a similar yet bolder interpretation: “It would be an unfortu-
nate mistake to assume, on the basis of his vociferously critical views, that Nietzsche 
assumes a purely negative stance vis-à-vis compassion. A more careful reading of his 
oeuvre reveals, on the contrary, that there is room in Nietzsche’s philosophy for a 
healthy form of compassion.”16 He discredits “the simplistic view that Nietzsche is 
opposed to compassion and benevolence in all its forms (a view uncritically accepted 
by most Nietzsche commentators).” Stated briefly, according to the commentators, 
it is not compassion (and its concern for suffering) that is bad, but only the way we 
express our compassion, or the way we attend to suffering. I maintain that if we closely 
examine the details of this interpretation, it will be found that it is actually not fully 
satisfactory as it relies on certain assumptions that starkly clash with Nietzsche’s own 
assessment of the issue.
For Nietzsche, Harris thinks, “we respond to others in a healthy way when we 
attend to suffering not as an evil per se, but as potentially, though not necessarily, frus-
trating the particular potential of those we know and care about.”17 What Nietzsche 
refers to as “your compassion,” Panaïoti suggests, involves suffering with the other 
passively and thus responding to it reactively, as a source of enfeeblement and weak-
ness. “Our compassion,” in contrast, is about responding to the other’s suffering as a 
challenge to overcome, as an opportunity to engage actively in the flourishing of the 
other. More specifically, although, as Panaïoti points out, “our compassion” also “in-
volves suffering on account of the other’s woe,” “this suffering is experienced as stim-
ulating and invigorating rather than enfeebling and depressing.”18 And since “our 
compassion” does not involve feeling vulnerable at witnessing the other’s plight, but 
rather an invigorating engagement with another’s negative state or situation which 
surpasses the potentially detrimental effects of empathic distress, it signifies a suc-
cessful use of empathy in dealing with those in need.
Now I agree with the main assumption of Harris’s and Panaïoti’s accounts of 
Nietzsche, namely, that Nietzsche proposes an alternative way of attending to others’ 
suffering. However, there are exegetical difficulties with their views. The most press-
ing of these is that it is not clear how we could possibly reconcile Nietzsche’s claim 
that compassion weakens us with his apparent praise of one form of compassion. 
But apart from this, there are other difficulties and drawbacks of this reading as well. 
15 Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, Cambridge, MA 2008, 
185.
16 Antoine Panaïoti, Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, Cambridge 2013, 187.
17 Harris, “Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche,” 24.
18 Panaïoti, Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, 190.
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There are two issues with the conception of compassion the commentators attribute 
to Nietzsche.
First, according to Harris, for Nietzsche, “compassion as concern for suffering 
is not condemnable in itself, but only when such concern erases any vantage point 
on our situation that might lend suffering significance.”19 As we discussed above, 
Nietzsche regards compassion, by its very nature, to be injurious as it is predicated 
upon self-loss and lack of empathic accuracy. This is then simply incompatible with 
any view that says that compassion is regrettable only when such and such is the 
case. Thus, there is a reason to be suspicious of Harris’s reading. Moreover, Nietzsche 
thinks, even if the compassionate person has the right sort of relation to suffering 
(i.  e., even if they do not attend to the other’s suffering as bad or evil per se), there 
is an active harm associated with all experiences of compassion, including also the 
cases of “better” compassion, i.  e., “our compassion.” Compassionate sensibility (for 
suffering) is something Nietzsche tirelessly warns against because those who make 
room for it within themselves will be so much taken with compassion as to incline 
to give in to it. As a result, they will “involuntarily become the glorifiers of the good, 
compassionate, benevolent, impulses of that instinctive morality which has no head, 
but seems to consist only of heart and helpful hands” (HH II, WS 45; my translation).
Now, perhaps Harris would insist that there is a healthy kind of compassion that 
can overcome this danger. He might point out that Nietzsche distinguishes between 
different kinds of compassion in BGE 225, describing one as actually being life-af-
firming and healthy. I maintain that compassion, even in its most compelling form 
(as characterized by Harris, Panaïoti, and others), is not good enough for Nietzsche, 
because he considers it to be fundamentally bad for human beings as creators and 
thus remains to the end strongly critical of all compassion. I believe that scholars tend 
to ignore this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy entirely. Furthermore, for Nietzsche, 
the danger is not that one falls into the “unhealthy” kind of compassion, but that one 
falls into compassion. Therefore, “the overcoming of compassion [die Überwindung 
des Mitleids],” Nietzsche claims, is “the ultimate test, which a Zarathustra must pass–
his real proof of strength” (EH, Why I Am so Wise 4). In other words, we do not come 
across a Nietzsche, as in the words of Harris, “holding open the possibility of healthier 
forms of shared suffering to be encouraged.”20
Second, according to Panaïoti, for Nietzsche, compassionate suffering can be ex-
perienced as stimulating and invigorating, as actually increasing one’s (feeling of) 
power. If so, then not all compassion is necessarily bad. I disagree with Panaïoti here. 
Panaïoti’s interpretation seems to contradict those passages in Nietzsche’s later work 
where he expressly speaks of compassion as an essentially weakening affect: “Com-
passion stands in contrast to the tonic affects that increase the energy of the feeling 
19 Harris, “Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche,” 18.
20 Harris, “Compassion and Affirmation in Nietzsche,” 18.
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of life: it is depressing. One loses strength when one shows compassion. Through 
compassion, the loss of strength, which is already brought about by the suffering of 
life, further increases and multiplies” (A 7; my translation). Nietzsche’s remark here 
is straightforward: there is nothing stimulating, nor invigorating about compassion. 
Then, we have a reason to doubt Panaïoti’s claim that some form of compassion may 
involve a feeling of enhanced power. If compassionate suffering can be experienced as 
stimulating and invigorating, as Panaïoti suggests, this can be so, Nietzsche believes, 
only because when “one fails to apprehend what is injurious about [compassion] and 
discovers in it instead a source of pleasure” (D 134).
4  Overcoming Compassion
Nietzsche presents compassion as a great danger (in the sense of actively injuring the 
person feeling it), but also approves of something that he presents as a different kind 
of compassion. In this section, I will show that one way of dealing with this tension in 
Nietzsche is to focus on exactly what function(s) Nietzsche want(s) “our compassion” 
to serve.
Drawing his inspiration from the ancient Greek and Roman thought, Nietzsche 
reevaluates and reinterprets the concept of compassion in a way to counteract the 
dangerous passivity of Schopenhauerian compassion and thereby represent a way to 
steer or guide humanity to the goal of creation and accomplishment. One crucial thing 
to note is that Nietzsche’s discussion of a different kind of compassion in BGE 225 
is essentially polemical in character and cannot be understood without considering 
the specific nature of his ultimate polemics against Schopenhauerian (or Christian) 
Mitleid. Nietzsche’s main goal here is to contrast our modern culture of compassion 
with a culture of greatness, and to convince his readers of the desirability of moving 
from the former to the latter:
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering – do you not know that only this discipline has 
created all enhancements of the human being so far? […] And our compassion  – do you not 
understand for whom our reverse compassion is when it defends itself against your compassion 
as the worst of all mollycoddling and undermining? (BGE 225; my translation)
What Nietzsche calls “our compassion” does not induce in one a sense of passive 
suffering and thereby belittle human creative possibility. It is no longer compassion 
with social distress, with the broader society and its particular problems. It is not 
“compassion for the grumbling, oppressed, rebellious slave strata who yearn for dom-
inance–which they call ‘freedom’” (BGE 225). The attention, the focus of “our compas-
sion” is not the passive objects of suffering whose only chance is to be redeemed by 
sharing suffering because their life is valuable only if they can help each other. They 
are not the agents of their own suffering – but rather the victims of inevitable suffer-
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ing – and a fortiori less so the agents of their own liberation. It is clear that without 
this distinction at our disposal, namely the distinction between those who are the 
subjects of their own suffering, i.  e., the “creator, form-giver,” and those who simply 
suffer, i.  e., “the ‘creature in the human being,’ […] that which necessarily must and 
should suffer,” we could not make sense of Nietzsche’s call of “compassion against 
compassion [Mitleid also g e g e n  Mitleid]” (BGE 225; my translation). The passive and 
reactive “creature” aspect of person versus the aspect of person as “creator” seems to 
be playing with Christian dualism: the ontological dichotomy between human being 
as creature and God as creator, and the obvious privileging of the creator over the 
creature. Creature in a person stands for the animal nature of human being, all its 
drives and sensibilities. Creator in a person, however, symbolizes a God-like powerful 
being effectively dominant over its passive and malleable side, able to organize it into 
a unified entity. Nietzsche condemns “your compassion” because of its focus on the 
creature in a person. But what does it exactly mean to have compassion for the creator 
as creator? We normally feel compassion for those who are in grief, need of our help 
and support, not for those who are already in a better position.
This strange emphasis on the well-being of human beings as creators is in part 
explained by Nietzsche’s contention that “our compassion” involves “a higher, more 
farsighted” attitude to suffering, which is ultimately concerned with the enhancement 
of human life and the emergence of exceptional individuals (BGE 225). Apparently, 
this theme is already present in D146, where Nietzsche criticizes the “narrow and petty 
bourgeois morality,” its praise for compassionate behavior at the expense of hinder-
ing and distorting opportunities for self-growth and development. The assumption 
he attacks is the idea of determining whether a decision is genuinely ethical or not by 
taking into account the most immediate and direct impact of our actions on others’ 
well-being. The problem is formulated as follows: there are sometimes immediate con-
sequences and suffering that ensue from our actions and which, in turn, affect us and 
others involved. If our actions are always to handle human activities with a motive to 
avert or alleviate these most immediate consequences, then the ideal of human great-
ness can never thrive. We must, therefore, Nietzsche suggests, pay attention to the 
consequences of our action on human character and development, on the conditions 
in which the feeling of self-power becomes deeper, stronger, and more intense, which 
in turn allows greatness to develop. For Nietzsche, the problem requires a solution 
that involves a transposition of our ordinary moral schema into “a higher and freer 
manner of thought that looks beyond these most immediate consequences for others 
and to further more distant aims, under some circumstances even at the expense of 
the suffering of others” (D146). More specifically, the solution can only be carried 
out if we “get beyond our compassion and […] gain a victory over ourselves” (D 146), 
which is precisely taken to be “a higher and freer bearing and attitude” than a narrow, 
risk-averse cost-benefit attitude towards human relationships. There are many chal-
lenges, distress, and risks that come along with creation or great form-giving effort. 
And, for Nietzsche, only “through sacrifice” we and others would “strengthen and 
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elevate the general feeling of human power” (D 146), and hence create the ground for 
greatness.
“Your compassion” requires suffering together, that only through solidarity and a 
sharing of the suffering with other people, can suffering be overcome. “Our compas-
sion,” on the other hand, requires the discipline of suffering, that we overcome suffer-
ing by enduring it and finding our own creative potential in the process. Nietzsche’s 
“compassion” does not have the negative valence of ordinary compassion: it is not 
compassion in the sense of an active motivation to share the suffering of others and 
pursue their welfare. Nor does it condemn suffering as something bad or evil. Its target 
is no longer distress and misery, but life and specifically its unrealized potentials and 
possibilities. Here Nietzsche expresses his frustration at those who have failed to 
exploit the opportunities available to realize their potential for self-growth and excel-
lence. And he reserves his greatest anger for the plight of those promising ones who 
are cast-aside or stepped over because of “your compassion.” Hence Nietzsche says, 
“how the human is becoming smaller, how you are making it smaller! – and there are 
moments when we regard precisely your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, 
when we resist this compassion” (BGE 225).
Nietzsche’s polemical rhetoric reaches its zenith in BGE 293, where he remarks: 
“a man who is a master by nature – when such a man has compassion, well now! 
this compassion has value!” And he adds in a provocative manner: “But what good 
is the compassion of sufferers! Or for that matter of the preachers of compassion!”21 
Incidentally, Reginster uses this passage as a decisive proof that Nietzsche approves 
of certain expressions of compassion.22 I suggest that any interpretation that will be 
faithful to Nietzsche’s intentions requires a more careful examination of his seemingly 
positive attitude about the value of compassion. What commentators, in my view, tend 
to ignore is that just because something is valuable does not mean it is not also dan-
gerous. Nietzsche explicitly describes compassion as especially dangerous for the ex-
ceptional individual. Consequently, the thrust of Nietzsche’s thinking on compassion 
is that it is to be overcome. Nothing is valuable in and of itself. Rather, for Nietzsche, 
it is always a matter of being valuable for something or to someone (GS 301). Perhaps, 
one is blessed to be on the receiving end of the master’s compassion because this kind 
of compassion infallibly discerns the facts about the suffering it encounters and typ-
ically leads to action that brings relief and healing. The preachers of compassion, on 
the other hand, remain passively suffering with, rather than actively aiding others. It 
is in this sense, Nietzsche claims, some compassion has value; it is good (i.  e., benefi-
21 Literally, the text here reads as follows: “But what lies in the compassion of those who suffer! 
Or those who even preach compassion! [Aber was liegt am Mitleiden Derer, welche leiden! Oder Derer, 
welche gar Mitleiden predigen!]” (BGE 293; my translation) To be specific, Nietzsche does not use the 
term “good” (or other value terms) here.
22 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 185.
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cial) for those who suffer. But the question is, is indulging in a sense of shared vulner-
ability good for the master? Is it good for him to be on the giving end of compassion? 
I do not think so. But then why does Nietzsche state that the master’s compassion has 
value? We cannot hope to find an answer to this without the context of the rest of the 
passage, which more fully uncovers the polemical motivation of Nietzsche’s attack 
on those who tend to exalt compassion as a virtue (which Reginster neglects to cite):
Almost everywhere in Europe today there is a pathological sensitivity and irritability to pain, 
likewise a repulsive lack of restraint in whining, a tenderization that tries to dress itself up as 
something higher with religion and philosophical odds and ends – there is a veritable cult of 
suffering. The unmanliness of what is christened “compassion” in such circles of fanatics is the 
first thing that meets the eye, in my opinion (BGE 293).
Surely, here Nietzsche seeks to provoke a certain kind of reaction in the readers. On 
the one hand, it should be potentially upsetting (for some at least) to hear that their 
compassion is worthless. On the other, Nietzsche’s words will hopefully help some 
to question the value of compassion, its significance, and detrimental effects on 
culture. Viewing his remarks in their entire context indicates that Nietzsche is subtly 
suggesting the irony that while Christians say that compassion is their quintessential 
virtue, representing the core of their doctrine, i.  e., Christ’s suffering for humanity 
on the cross, they are not strong enough to live up to the moral ideal they proclaim. 
Their compassion has no value. Only the strong-willed individual can feel compassion 
proper, and act according to what is required from a compassionate person. Having 
made this point, Nietzsche’s polemic of “compassion against compassion” (BGE 225) 
is now complete, which is essentially intended to instruct the reader (who are poten-
tial creators) and not necessarily serve the needs of society and its disadvantaged 
subjects.
Nietzsche’s vindication of “our compassion” is a way to pull through the dangers 
of “your (Schopenhauerian) compassion” and find a new strength to revive our inter-
est in challenges of life and greatness. But this is not the end of “our compassion,” 
a point that has not been adequately appreciated or explained in the recent litera-
ture. Even though it is a different (and better) form of compassion, “our compassion” 
qua compassion is fundamentally (and decidedly) regrettable. So then, the question 
remains: what makes “our compassion” valuable other than its focus on greatness? 
What is it ultimately good for? According to Reginster, in many ways, “Nietzsche’s as-
sessment of the value of compassion […] remains a source of puzzlement.”23 Panaïoti 
seems more on the mark with his articulation of the issue when he says that Nietzsche 
ultimately prescribes the overcoming of compassion as a necessary step to greatness. 
Yet, overcoming of compassion and cultivating a certain form of compassion (i.  e., 
“our compassion”) are two goals that do not appear to go well together or work to-
23 Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 185.
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gether. Thus, Panaïoti observes, “it seems as though Nietzsche does not establish 
clearly enough a link between [the two].”24 I suggest, as paradoxical as it may seem, 
that the highest aim or ultimate goal of “our (Nietzschean) compassion” is to prepare 
those creators that hold the key to human greatness for the ultimate test, which is 
the overcoming of all compassion. In order to see how this is so, we must attend in 
particular to a few of the salient passages in Zarathustra, which is primarily a book 
about reflexively becoming aware of various ways we stifle our own potential and the 
potential of those around us–and hence a book about those who strive towards the 
ideal of self-overcoming and transformation.
“Our compassion” constantly looks for greatness and the possibilities of future 
greatness. Yet, it never finds what it is looking for, but – and this is a crucial but – “our 
compassion” persists without diminution, it regains its impulse, its movement from 
this very failure to meet greatness face to face. Consider Zarathustra’s initial feeling 
of compassion for the higher men that he has been encountering during his journey 
of self-overcoming, who “herald the coming of the lightning” (Z I, Prologue 4), and 
thereby can provide humanity with a new goal and meaning to pursue. The soothsayer 
of the great weariness, a Schopenhauer-like character, at this point tries to seduce 
Zarathustra to his final sin, i.  e., compassion for the higher men (Z IV, The Cry of Dis-
tress). This fellow feeling, however, dissipates quickly once Zarathustra realizes that 
these higher men “haven’t yet suffered from human beings” nor do they “suffer from 
what [Zarathustra] suffered” (Z IV, On the Higher Man 6), and therefore, “they are 
not [his] proper companions!” (Z IV, The Sign) Although first struck by this profound 
fellow feeling for the higher men, Zarathustra later becomes agitated and angry in the 
face of this feeling, the temptation to attend to and help with others’ concerns, which 
he regards as his “last sin” (Z IV, The Sign). One’s greatness, Nietzsche is convinced, 
can be measured only by having achieved a Zarathustra-like attitude towards compas-
sion. In other words, this last sin is also the ultimate test of Zarathustra’s strength and 
thereby the greatest opportunity for growth.
Now, Nietzsche’s argument about (the overcoming of) compassion boils down 
to this: “our compassion” does not try to save us from suffering but affirms that the 
core of human greatness is formed and fostered in and through suffering. Hence 
Nietzsche says elsewhere: “You want […] to abolish suffering; and we?–it seems as 
though we would prefer to have it even higher and worse than it ever was!” (BGE 225) 
The standard for greatness set by Nietzsche (via Zarathustra) exceeds all expectations 
and hence ever evolves towards a greater perfection. The standard is so high that even 
a rare and select group of individuals fall short of it. Since we know that greatness 
is not meant to be achieved through the (cumulative) activities of some higher men, 
“our compassion” can never find a practical outlet to manifest itself and therefore falls 
back on hard work, effort, and perseverance. And so, in the final part, the overcoming 
24 Panaïoti, Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, 208–9.
262   Vasfi O. Özen
of compassion ultimately announces itself with the advent of Zarathustra’s children, 
who represent the epitome of his desire to create over and beyond himself, and to 
which the higher men are only a bridge (Z IV, The Sign).
Here a caveat is in order. Here “overcoming” does not mean to fully eradicate the 
temptations of compassion from sight, but to be able to recognize them and take one’s 
mind off of them so that one can live for the sake of one’s work. So, I tend to agree with 
Michael Frazer when he says that “Zarathustra never ‘overcomes’ his compassion in 
the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all.”25 Once struck by a powerful and 
almost cathartic feeling of compassion, Zarathustra achieves the ultimate insight 
into the creature-creator duality in human nature, namely that “the ‘creature in 
humans’ […] must be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, melted and purified” and 
therefore “must necessarily suffer and should suffer” (BGE 225). In the end, Zara-
thustra simply dismisses his suffering and compassion: “what do they matter!” (Z IV, 
The Sign) A life in which compassion does not matter means that compassion does 
not determine or guide one’s relations and interactions with the surrounding world. 
Therefore, I reject Frazer’s suggestion that Zarathustra ultimately comes to affirm his 
compassion as necessary in achieving deeper insight into the human condition. Fraz-
er’s argument, put simply, is that banishing compassion, and of eradicating the most 
essential fellow feelings from the human breast “requires us shield ourselves from 
the troubling awareness of our fellows’ plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional 
bonds which connect us to others.”26 More specifically, “[i]t requires that we turn 
against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge 
for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition.”27 Frazer is, however, 
unable to cite direct textual support in Zarathustra for this suggestion. So, he turns to 
BGE 227, where Nietzsche speaks of the regrettable aspects of philosophical honesty, 
“supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits-well, 
let us work on it with all our malice and love and not weary of ‘perfecting’ ourselves 
in our virtue.” Frazer suggests that “Zarathustra treats compassion similarly, realizing 
that sympathetic suffering is inseparable from his imaginative creativity.”28 Unfortu-
nately, the textual basis for this interpretation is tenuous at best. Setting aside the lack 
of textual support, a couple of points should be clarified. First, Zarathustra’s encoun-
ter with the higher men was his ultimate opportunity to be put to the test, once and for 
all. He already passed the test once, and saw through the misconceptions and realized 
what value and significance “co-suffering” with others really has for him. So there 
seems no point in speculating that there is no guarantee that Zarathustra “will fail 
25 Michael Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength,” The Re-
view of Politics 68 (2006), 49–78: 73.
26 Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra,” 75.
27 Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra,” 75.
28 Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra,” 74.
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to experience compassion upon further encounters with suffering.”29 Second, Zara-
thustra does not overcome all fellow feeling, but only a specific fellow feeling, i.  e., 
shared suffering or compassion. Third, Frazer claims that: “Compassion may cause 
him real misery, but, when properly harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathus-
tra’s creativity.”30 Frazer never quite explains in any satisfactory detail what exactly 
this controlling/harnessing compassion creatively entails for Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s 
letter to Meysenbug, cited earlier, makes it unambiguously clear that he contrasts 
compassion with acting creatively: “One should enforce one’s own ideal of human 
being, one should, with his ideal, force and overpower one’s fellow human beings as 
oneself: and thus act creatively! But to do this, one needs to hold one’s compassion 
in strong check” (Mid July 1883, no. 437, KSB 6.404; my translation). Again, leaving 
admissible this philosophically intriguing but textually thin interpretation, I suggest 
that Nietzsche offers alternatives that are more effective and preferable in advancing 
human self-actualization and growth.31 This final point brings me to a particularly 
29 Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra,” 73.
30 Frazer, “The Compassion of Zarathustra,” 73.
31 In an unpublished fragment, for instance, Nietzsche embraces an alternative attitude to Schopen-
hauerian compassion, “This is my kind of ‘compassion’, although there is really no sufferer with whom 
I suffer [Dies ist meine Art “Mitleid”; ob es schon keinen Leidenden giebt, mit dem ich da litte]” (Nachlass 
1885, 36[7], KSA 11.552; my translation). The first thing to notice here is that this remark contradicts 
Panaïoti’s claim that Nietzschean compassion also involves suffering on account of the other’s woe 
(Panaïoti, Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy, 190). Nietzsche’s kind of compassion sprouts not from 
suffering, but from the need for (more) suffering. In other words, Nietzsche’s kind of compassion is not 
concerned with suffering as such, but with those who lack enough of it. This implies that Nietzschean 
compassion is not the same as what we ordinarily call “compassion.” It is something quite different: 
it is “compassion” despite the fact that there is no sufferer, or not enough suffering: “You do not suffer 
enough in my opinion!” (Z IV, On the Higher Man 6) In his analysis of this fragment, Bernard Reginster, 
in my view, uncritically accepts this unusual conception as a given, noting that Nietzsche conceives 
of compassion as “a response not primarily to suffering”, and if so “Nietzschean compassion may 
be aroused by the lack of suffering” (Reginster, The Affirmation of Life, 187). But how can there be 
compassion in the absence of suffering? Compassion literally means “suffering with,” which implies 
a sharing in another’s suffering. I think we should not take Nietzsche on his own terms here, as com-
mentators often do. He no longer uses compassion in any recognizable sense of the word. He keeps 
the word “compassion” but ascribes to it an entirely new meaning. It is not without a reason when 
Nietzsche says, “This [i.  e., his kind of compassion] is a feeling for which I find no name adequate” 
(Nachlass 1885, 36[7], KSA 11.552; trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale). And it is precisely because of this 
terminological inadequacy and conceptual indeterminacy, his attempt to describe this feeling simply 
collapses under its own weight: “I sense [this feeling] when I see precious capabilities squandered […]. 
Or when I see anyone halted, as a result of some stupid accident, at something less than he might have 
become. Or especially at the idea of the lot of mankind, as when I observe with anguish and contempt 
the politics of present-day Europe, which is, under all circumstances, also working at the web of the 
future of all men” (Nachlass 1885, 36[7], KSA 11.552; trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale). This feeling 
for which there is no adequate name does not suggest compassion but rather anger. We recognize 
a similar ambiguity in Nietzsche’s speaking of a kind of “indignation” that the ancient Greeks felt 
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misunderstood aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, i.  e., the ethical implications of over-
coming compassion.
5  After Compassion
On the way to greatness, “we become hard against everything in us that desires con-
sideration.” Hence Nietzsche concludes with a flourish, “our greatness is also our lack 
of compassion” (GS 28).32 Now we need to be cautious not to assume too much too 
quickly. It is not that Nietzsche objects to compassion and therefore also dismisses 
benevolence and empathy altogether. This should address the concerns of those (es-
pecially Reginster and Panaïoti) who seem to be worried that Nietzsche rules out com-
passion as of any relevance to our moral life.33 Nietzsche maintains, from his middle 
period on at any rate, that “life turns green and blossoms only by means of that benev-
olence” (HH I 49). Furthermore, he singles out the effectiveness of benevolence values 
in contributing to cultural life because they serve to keep alive and nourish the qual-
ities that make individuals more fruitful in social interactions: “Good-naturedness, 
friendliness, politeness of the heart, are the ever-flowing streams of the unegotistical 
“over someone else’s misfortune”, referring to it as “this more manly brother of compassion [diesen 
m ä n n l i c h e r e n  Bruder des Mitleidens]” (D 78). What Nietzsche describes here is what some classi-
cists refer to as “[heroic] rage at the world’s (or the gods’) coldness to human aspirations” (Stephen 
Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton, NJ 2002, 113, 
fn. 31). Alternatively, modern psychologists refer to this feeling as “empathic anger,” i.  e. the kind of 
empathy experienced as anger on behalf of a victimized person (Guy D. Vitaglione / Mark A. Barnett, 
“Assessing a New Dimension of Empathy: Empathic Anger as a Predictor of Helping and Punishing 
Desires,” Motivation and Emotion 27 (2003), 301–25). At first glance, it appears that “empathic anger” 
is the most appropriate term for the phenomenon that concerns Nietzsche. However, I do not believe 
that what Nietzsche approves of can be, strictly speaking, regarded as empathic anger. Although anger 
at circumstances or people who may be perceived to be the cause of some misfortune to the victim may 
play a factor in arousing empathic sensations from the subject, I maintain there is more to the phe-
nomenon than can be described by empathic anger. But I will not pursue this matter any further here.
32 Here the German is: “unsere Grösse ist auch unsere Unbarmherzigkeit” (GS 28). What Kaufmann 
translates as “lack of compassion” is actually a positive, single term Unbarmherzigkeit which can be 
rendered as “mercilessness,” “heartlessness,” or “ruthlessness.” But “lack of compassion” is also a 
reasonable choice.
33 It seems to me that Martha Nussbaum’s criticism of Nietzsche’s views on Mitleid is still quite 
powerful. I am inclined to see the commentators’ views as having arisen under the influence of such 
(misguided) criticism. Commentators appear to promote an alternative picture of Nietzsche’s views 
of the value of compassion that is more attuned to ethical considerations and hence less controver-
sial (though not necessarily true to Nietzsche’s central intentions). Nussbaum’s misreadings are well 
known among most Nietzsche scholars, but perhaps less so elsewhere. For an account of some of 
Nussbaum’s misunderstandings of Nietzsche’s thought, see, for instance, Tevenar, “Nietzsche’s Ob-
jections to Pity and Compassion.”
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drive and have worked more powerfully in building culture than those much more 
famed expressions of it that we call sympathy, compassion, and sacrifice” (HH I 49). 
However, Nietzsche later also came to acknowledge that motivations behind benev-
olence and philanthropic assistance may be considered suspect especially when the 
benefactor is in a position of power and has leverage over the beneficiary. He says, for 
instance, “the noble human being also helps the unfortunate, but not or almost not 
from compassion [aber nicht oder fast nicht aus Mitleid], but from an urge produced 
by an excess of power [sondern mehr aus einem Drang, den der Überfluss von Macht 
erzeugt]” (BGE 260). But what can be said about the kind of assistance that is coming 
from a position of strength?34 At times, Nietzsche appears hesitant about it and does 
not believe it can ever be sincere or well-intended. He says: “We benefit and show be-
nevolence to those who are already dependent on us in some way (which means that 
they are used to thinking of us as causes); we want to increase their power because in 
that way we increase ours, or we want to show them how advantageous it is to be in 
our power” (GS 13). Nevertheless, this is not how Nietzsche thinks ‘the noble human 
being’ acts towards others. True to the character of a noble person, those who possess 
(excess of) power, as Zarathustra remarks, “strive for the bestowing virtue” (Z I, On the 
Bestowing Virtue). The noble human being possesses the virtue to utilize and harness 
power to empower others, increasing their resources, capabilities, effectiveness, and 
ability to act, while being fully aware that injudicious kindness only forces them into 
dependent lives. Hence Zarathustra says to his disciples: “Insatiably your soul strives 
for treasures and gems, because your virtue is insatiable in wanting to bestow. You 
compel all things to and into yourselves, so that they may gush back from your well as 
the gifts of your love” (Z I, On the Bestowing Virtue).
34 Diamantides misses the meaning of this crucial passage entirely. He says, for Nietzsche, “the 
options for modern man are either to react to instances of others’ suffering with ‘morbid’ – moral or 
empathic – pity denying, in the process, the meaninglessness of suffering; or with productive, ‘life af-
firming’ compassion qua will to power without attempting to derive the compassionate action’s value 
from any external source” (Diamantides, “Law’s Ignoble Compassion,” 98). So far, I agree with what 
Diamantides says for the most part. However, he continues and remarks: “In Will to Power, Daybreak, 
and other works, the idea of compassion as a life-affirming response to another being’s suffering is 
explained negatively and is distinguished from morbid pity, which underlies moral duty. In short, the 
master may act kindly upon a weaker other out of a surplus of energy – not from a submission to moral 
duty, utilitarian calculus or, more immediately, out of empathic identification, fear of pain, and need 
for pleasure” (98). Diamantides appears to be characterizing life-affirming compassionate helping in 
terms of a disposition to help out of excess of power. As the context of BGE 260 makes it crystal clear, 
helping out of compassion and helping out of excess of power are two distinct phenomena. When the 
noble human being helps the needy, it is an expression of the noble’s excess power. Power determines 
value. Therefore, there is value in that act of giving. Nietzsche’s main point, which Diamantides fails 
to mention adequately, is that the noble humans are fortunate and are not suffering and so they do not 
need to identify with the unfortunate who are suffering. Because the noble human being is not simi-
larly situated as the unfortunate, the former simply cannot share any affinity and hence only helps out 
of excess of power (a phenomenon that bears no relation whatsoever to compassion).
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But one may object to this line of reasoning by pointing out that you will have 
the ability to help others not just because you operate from a position of strength, 
but also because you are more sensitive and aware to others’ feelings and identify 
your own feelings in others. According to Schopenhauer, if motive is present, but the 
person does not recognize it or lacks the knowledge and sensibility, there will be no 
consciousness to act and move according to the motive. He says:
For the relationship between (for instance) egoism and compassion to emerge in any given 
person, it is not enough for that person to possess wealth and see others in need; he must also 
know what wealth can do both for himself and for others; the suffering of others must not only 
present itself, he must also know what suffering is.35
“But then,” Schopenhauer asks elsewhere, “how is it possible that a suffering that 
is not mine, that does not afflict me, should nonetheless become a motive for me, 
should move me to acting, just as immediately as only my own suffering otherwise 
does?”36 Even though another’s suffering is “given to me as something external,” it is 
“by my feeling it as well, feeling it as mine, yet not in me but in another”37 that I come 
to recognize another’s suffering and feel motivated to relieve that suffering. In other 
words, for Schopenhauer, it is primarily the compassion that one feels for another 
who is suffering, and not one’s own strength or bestowing love, that will drive one’s 
consciousness to act benevolently in a way that alleviates another’s suffering.
Nietzsche seems to draw our attention to a kind of benevolence that is based on 
and strives for a continued and richer understanding of the life activities of others, as 
opposed to Schopenhauerian compassion, which involves being affected by others’ 
predicament but without a greater awareness of the causes and effects of their expe-
riences. Nietzsche rejects Mitleid because it is not the sort of thing that can produce 
a non-superficial insight into another’s suffering. As a matter of fact, Mitleid is auto-
matic (i.  e., impulsive) and lacks intellectual depth and genuine empathic responsive-
ness, as evidenced by Schopenhauer’s remark that “the excitation of our compassion 
is not accompanied by any particular effort of our intellect.”38 I take this as one of 
the main motivations behind Nietzsche’s effort to replace compassion with a different 
form of empathy:
What we suffer most deeply and personally is almost incomprehensible and inaccessible to 
almost everyone else […]. But wherever we are noticed as sufferers, our suffering is interpreted 
shallowly; it belongs to the essence of compassionate affection that it undresses the unfamiliar 
35 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. and ed. Judith Norman, 
Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway, Cambridge 2010, 321.
36 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals,” 218.
37 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals,” 218.
38 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, trans. and ed. Judith Norman, 
Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway, Cambridge 2010, 616.
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suffering of its genuinely personal aspects: – our “benefactors” are more than our enemies, the 
reducers of our worth and will. In most of the benefits done to the unfortunate person, there 
is something outrageous in the intellectual recklessness with which the compassionate person 
plays the role of destiny: one knows nothing of the whole inner sequence and intertwining, 
which misfortune is for me or for you! (GS 338; my translation)
The underlying idea in the above critique is that compassion lacks the kind of intel-
lectual depth and rigor essential to genuine help. Perhaps in many circumstances 
it is possible to relieve suffering through the shallow acts of compassion. And this 
explains why Schopenhauer has such faith in “the everyday phenomenon of compas-
sion, i.  e. the wholly immediate sympathy, independent of any other consideration, 
in the first place towards another’s suffering, and hence towards the prevention or 
removal of this suffering, which is ultimately what all satisfaction and all well-being 
and happiness consists in.”39 However, and this is important, Nietzsche’s main objec-
tion is that relieving some suffering requires a deep understanding of the other’s ex-
periential state. In compassion, we focus on the feeling and not its role in the person’s 
life – its causes, effects, and potential “disciplinary” function. Nietzsche implicitly 
admonishes us to lay aside any preconceptions, which are likely misconceptions, that 
we may have as to the nature of another’s suffering, or that may stand as barrier to 
another’s flourishing. Nietzsche’s argument appears to be this: compassion with its 
essential indifference to the individual character of suffering only aims at the release 
of suffering. This, in turn, results in the neglect of the disciplining effect of suffering. 
Because compassion lacks a deeper understanding of human suffering and aspira-
tions, it tends to do more harm than good for some. Therefore, it is better not to give 
in to generous and compassionate affects.
Compassion’s lack of genuine understanding seems to be due to its characteristic 
of eliminating the distinction between an individual and others.40 This experience of 
nondualism or oneness, i.  e., the instinctual recognition that beneath our apparent 
separateness as individuals, we are essentially related to one another through the 
inward experience of our own willing, in effect eliminates the need for the subject to 
understand, or at least to be tuned in to, another’s situation, feelings, and thoughts. 
There is no such thing as the other, since we are all one being. Therefore, another’s 
suffering loses its particularity and becomes an instantiation of universal suffer-
ing. Compassion signifies the ultimate suppression and assimilation of all opposi-
tion, difference, and becoming that is integral to one’s edification and betterment; 
for Nietzsche, it presents the danger of devaluing of one’s own will. For the reasons 
provided above, Nietzsche strongly reacts to this account of compassion (and the ex-
perience of oneness associated with it) by holding to a theory of empathy in which 
greatness, individuality, and self-stylization play the central roles.
39 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals,” 200.
40 See Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, § 65 and § 68.
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Furthermore, the failure to temper and channel the excesses of compassionate 
affects negatively affects one’s ability to provide the effective help and support the 
other needs. Thus, Nietzsche warns:
Whoever even attempts at some point consciously to pursue for a period of time in his daily life 
every inducement to compassion will invariably turn sick and melancholic […], whoever wishes 
to [help] will have to be very cautious with regard to that sentiment – it lames him in all decisive 
moments and paralyzes his knowledge and his benevolent delicate hand (D 134).
What Nietzsche then suggests is that we are more likely to be helpful to others and 
have a positive influence on them when we remain mentally perceptive and emotion-
ally controlled in responding to their situation and try to help with understanding and 
accuracy. Hence, Nietzsche admonishes: “You will also want to help: but only those 
whose need you fully understand [ganz v e r s t e h s t ], because you and they possess 
in common one suffering and one hope–your friends: and only in the way you help 
yourself” (GS 338; my translation). The kind of empathic understanding evoked in the 
above remark does not require the warmth of compassion and its associated physio-
logical states (i.  e., the shared feeling of others’ suffering, or mirroring their sadness). 
Here Nietzsche is implicitly committed to what might be called an emotionally-con-
trolled perspective taking. One potential advantage of this type of non-compassionate 
empathy is to avoid the feelings of being overwhelmed by the others’ negative emo-
tional states that may prevent one from thinking outside of one’s own experiences and 
effectively grasping and reflecting on others’ experiential realities.
I suggest that the kind of empathy Nietzsche believes can be more effective than 
compassion consists of anticipatory inference and attentiveness, which allow for a 
wiser, deeper, and more genuine caring for another’s well-being. An intriguing per-
spective on this phenomenon is presented by relational-cultural theory (RCT), which 
is closely associated with psychotherapy and critical, feminist strands in psychology. 
RCT refers to this phenomenon, where one tries to anticipate what the other person is 
experiencing based on identifying situational and contextual cues of that individual’s 
emotional state, as “anticipatory empathy.”41 RCT therapy suggests that “a judicious 
use of emotional transparency and anticipatory empathy”42 positively correlates with 
more veridical emotional responsiveness to the joys, sufferings, and life situations of 
others. This responsiveness on the part of the empathizer over the sufferer does not 
require being motivated immediately by their suffering. Nor does it require that one 
shares all spontaneous emotional reactions. Rather, it calls for caution in conveying 
one’s concern for others.43
41 Judith V. Jordan, Relational-Cultural Therapy, Washington, DC 2018, 121.
42 Jordan, Relational-Cultural Therapy, 59.
43 Jordan, Relational-Cultural Therapy, 58.
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In expressing one’s empathic feelings it is important to be sensitive, but it is also 
important to establish boundaries effectively and appropriately with the other. Hence 
Zarathustra’s admonition: “The friend should be a master of guessing and keeping 
silent [Errathen und Stillschweigen]: you must not want to see everything” (Z I, On 
the Friend). When unchecked, our empathic concern may be too intrusive and debil-
itating to the point of preventing others from taking the necessary steps to overcome 
and grow out of the challenges they are faced with. Therefore, Zarathustra at times 
appears to be advocating only for limited empathic engagement: “Let your compas-
sion be a guessing, so that you might first know whether your friend wants compas-
sion. Perhaps what he loves in you is your unbroken eye and the look of eternity” (Z I, 
On the Friend). Here a caveat is in order. To be sure, Zarathustra frowns upon compas-
sion and aspires to overcome all compassion towards the misery of others. However, 
he maintains that if one cannot help but feel compassion now and then, one should 
guard against becoming too caring, to the point of interfering. After all, Zarathustra is 
aware that not everyone is strong and determined enough not to give in to it.
At this point, a question immediately presents itself: what is the main motivating 
force behind Nietzschean empathy? The kind of empathy that Nietzsche thinks we 
should embrace involves a deeper understanding of another’s emotional life in all its 
complex particularity, together with an appreciative joy in the success, good fortune, 
and joy of others. For Nietzsche, having such a capacity is not only compatible with 
but essential to growth, aspiration, and creativity:
A different character, one that has a rich capacity to share in the joys of others, wins friends 
everywhere, feels affection for all that is growing and becoming, shares the pleasure of others in 
all their honors and successes, and claims no privilege of being alone in recognizing truth, but is 
instead filled with a modest mistrust – that is an anticipatory [vorwegnehmender] person who is 
striving toward a higher human culture (HH I 614).
Now I would like to quickly highlight some of the interesting features of this distinct 
type of empathy and its difference with compassion. First, anticipatory empathy does 
not necessitate a co-suffering, i.  e., the sharing in another’s suffering. Once one picks 
up the cues of another’s suffering through one’s affective and representational capac-
ities, and (re)cognizes another’s suffering and its significance to them through inter-
subjective emotional resonance, there is no need to dwell in and co-experience that 
suffering.44 In this sense, anticipatory empathy is fundamentally different from what 
we ordinarily mean by “compassion.” Furthermore, anticipatory empathy is predicated 
44 Nietzsche speaks of the affective-cognitive mechanisms involved in the recognition of others’ expe-
riential state in D 142. I discuss this in greater detail in a paper under review elsewhere (Vasfi O. Özen, 
“Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy” (forthcoming)). This paper is not much about analyzing the nature 
and function of affects in empathic experience, but more about exploring Nietzsche’s ideas about the 
significance and value of certain empathetic/affect responses.
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on the separation of self and other, and on the recognition of individual experiential 
differences. It is worth noting that Nietzschean “anticipatory empathy” shares some 
common elements with contemporary feminist theories of empathy, according to which 
empathic responsiveness is understood as a dynamic relational process in which in-
dividuals maintain a well-differentiated sense of self and feel an increasing sense of 
emotional connectedness to each other.45 Second, anticipatory empathy’s target is 
not suffering per se, but the redemptive potential in suffering as constitutive of any 
meaningful, creative, and well-lived human life. This points out a crucial difference 
between anticipatory empathy and compassion in that the latter simply stems from an 
indiscriminate desire for others to be free from suffering. Third, and perhaps most im-
portantly, anticipatory empathy combines affection and cognition in a controlled and 
efficient way to gain a more accurate representation of another’s perspective or plight.
At this point, some qualifications must be noted to avoid a potential misconstrual 
of my argument here. Of course, I do not (even remotely) suggest that Nietzsche seeks 
to eliminate all affective response, all appearance of behavioral and emotional reci-
procity and rapport (i.  e., affect attunement between individuals). Affective engage-
ment requires one’s sense of belonging and identification with others. And in order for 
deeper understanding of another’s experiential state to occur, affective engagement 
must take place.46 However, and this is important, genuine empathy, for Nietzsche, 
45 Sharon Freedberg, “Re-examining Empathy: A Relational-Feminist Point of View,” Social Work 52 
(2007), 251–9: 254.
46 In D 142, Nietzsche entertains the view that empathy involves some kind of perceived similarity 
between the empathizer’s and the empathee’s subjective affective states. This idea finds considerable 
support in contemporary psychological research. Frédérique de Vignemont and Pierre Jacob claim that 
“the empathizer’s affective state [must stand] in some relevant similarity relation to her target’s affec-
tive state” (Frédérique de Vignemont / Pierre Jacob, “What Is It like to Feel Another’s Pain?”, Philoso-
phy of Science 79 (2012), 295–316: 305). In other words, if your emotional response is relevantly similar 
to my own affective state, then the fact that you sense my affective state must to some extent contribute 
to your understanding of my emotional experience (306). But how can we exactly know that there is 
a relevant similarity relation? Nietzsche is well aware of the problem of intersubjective reciprocity; 
there appears to be a discrepancy between my emotional experiences and those of others: “one simply 
knows nothing of the whole inner sequence and intricacies that are distress for me or for you” (GS 338). 
According to the psychologist Stephanie D. Preston, whether one is accurately empathizing or at least 
sensing the feeling states of others ultimately “depends upon whether the subject’s representations 
are similar enough to those of the object to convince the object that s/he is understood, or to convince 
observers that the object is understood” (Stephanie D. Preston, “A Perception-Action Model for Empa-
thy,” in Tom Farrow / Peter Woodruff (eds.), Empathy in Mental Illness, New York 2007, 428–47: 431). 
This is in a sense the only way to understand whether one feels an emotion appropriate to another’s 
emotion. The fact that I observe my own emotions resonate in you, the social psychologist David R. 
Heise further suggests, creates a unification in which I and you experience things with similar con-
sciousness. This is how, Heise hypothesizes, “[e]mpathic solidarity is established for [me] when [I] uni-
f[y] consciousness with [you] through [the reciprocal and mutual processes of] emotional resonance” 
(David R. Heise, “Conditions for Empathic Solidarity,” in Patrick Doreian / Thomas J. Fararo (eds.), The 
Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models, Amsterdam 1998, 197–211: 199).
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means to feel the particularity of another’s feeling without drowning inside it and 
thereby losing one’s personal identity and perspective. In an unpublished fragment, 
Nietzsche characterizes this as a “higher stage,” i.  e., not “being overwhelmed by 
stormy feelings” (Nachlass 1887/88, 11[353], KSA 13.153; trans. Kaufmann and Holling-
dale). And then he adds:
The same applies to compassion: it must first be habitually sifted by reason; otherwise it is just 
as dangerous as any other affect. Blind indulgence of an affect, totally regardless of whether it be 
a generous and compassionate or a hostile affect, is the cause of the greatest evils. Greatness of 
character does not consist in not possessing these affects – on the contrary, one possesses them 
to the highest degree – but in having them under control.
Here Nietzsche draws our attention once again to the challenges with affect regulation 
(in particular, regulating compassionate affects), and emphasizes the importance of 
the development of self-regulatory skills or affect regulation abilities. He warns that 
we do not let compassionate impulses to take precedence over our own emotional 
welfare. Fourth and last, unlike compassion, anticipatory empathy requires a keen 
sense of anticipation and understanding of what is at stake, for whom, and all con-
ceivable ways and means to achieve one’s vision. The anticipation of what is to come 
brings joy and excitement, which in turn inspires and motivates to action, and keeps 
us striving for a better state. Although Nietzsche does not use the term “anticipatory 
empathy,” it is, in my view, foreshadowed by him.
The concept of “anticipatory empathy” I am expounding here captures best 
Nietzsche’s ultimate effort to establish a culture of creative change and growth that 
is based on the sharing of joy with others. It is not Christ’s admonition to love and 
care for one’s neighbor and the suffering encountered in the world, but Zarathustra’s 
forward willing ethic of friendship and great action – along with the Nietzschean art 
of giving style to one’s own character (GS 290) – that is to be embraced and regarded 
as transformative. Thus, Zarathustra tells his would-be disciples: “I do not teach you 
the neighbor, but the friend. The friend shall be your festival of the earth and an an-
ticipation [Vorgefühl] of the overman […]. My brothers, I do not recommend love of 
the neighbor to you: I recommend love of the farthest to you” (Z I, On Love of the 
Neighbor). This is, for Nietzsche, something only “few now understand and those 
preachers of compassion [jene Prediger des Mitleidens] the least: – rejoicing with [d i e 
M i t f r e u d e ]!” (GS 338; my translation) But why does Nietzsche think that it is so 
much better for us to focus on Mitfreude instead of Mitleid? In Dawn (1881), Nietzsche 
seems to hint at an argument in favor of the value of shared joy: “Bringing joy to 
others. – Why is bringing joy the greatest of all joys? – Because we thereby bring joy 
to our separate fifty drives at one fell swoop. Individually they may each be very small 
joys: but if we put them all in one hand, then our hand is fuller than at any other 
time – and our heart as well! –” (D 422)
Nietzsche praises rejoicing with those who rejoice as perhaps the most effective 
way to bring creativity to one’s own life and personal growth. This is so because, as 
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Willow Verkerk correctly observes: “For Nietzsche, celebrating with others involves a 
shared creative movement that allows the drives to express themselves more fully.”47 
It should be added, however, that Nietzsche’s argument for empathic joy trades on a 
specific claim that he makes about the phenomenology of joy in Zarathustra: “Pain is 
also a joy, a curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun–go away or else you will learn: 
a wise man is also a fool. Have you ever said Yes to one joy? Oh my friends, then you 
also said Yes to all pain […] and say to pain also: refrain, but come back! For all joy 
wants – eternity!” (Z IV, The Sleepwalker Song 10)
What Nietzsche (via Zarathustra) is suggesting here is that it is only through our 
capacity for joy that we are capable of becoming strong enough to reinterpret mis-
fortune as opportunity to grow. This in turn implies that if one can connect with life 
stronger, it seems to be more through shared joy than shared suffering simply because 
Mitfreude functions to inspire one another to love and creative deeds, which enable us 
to bear suffering and best fulfill the ideal of self-actualization.48 Compassion, with its 
tendency to intervene to support and then to alleviate the distress perceived in others, 
often undermines the potential in striving for self-actualization as well as our capacity 
for finding satisfaction in overcoming obstacles. However, Nietzschean “anticipatory 
empathy,” as well as the mutual feelings of rejoicing that stem from it, steer us in the 
direction of a higher ideal of human existence. With its focus on grasping another’s 
underlying emotions and needs, such empathy becomes a crucial means in the service 
of the enhancement of life and one’s fellow human beings.
6  Concluding Remarks
If we accept Nietzsche’s critique of compassion, could we still somehow channel our 
compassion into the enhancement of human life and the emergence of exceptional 
individuals? My short answer is no, and the reasons can be briefly stated as follows. 
There is an inherent tendency in compassion to generalize others’ experiential mean-
ings and states of distress, which inevitably remains blind to higher aspects of the self. 
For Nietzsche, compassion is always regrettable no matter what short-term goods may 
be achieved by it. Compassion, regardless of what originally motivated it, stands in 
47 Willow Verkerk, Nietzsche and Friendship, London 2019, 37.
48 Some of Nietzsche’s unpublished fragments are especially interesting because they offer, in my 
view, the most direct articulation of his views on the subject. Nachlass 1878, 27[95], KSA 8.502, UFHH 
312: “Friends. – Nothing ties us together, but we have joy in one another, up to the point where one pro-
motes the other’s direction, even if it is diametrically opposed to his own.” Nachlass 1878, 31[9], KSA 
8.559, UFHH 366: “Friends, we take joy in one another as in fresh growth of nature and have regard 
for one another: thus we grow beside one another like trees, and precisely for that reason stretched 
upward and straight, because we extend ourselves by means of one another.”
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tension with the discipline of suffering, i.  e., the transformative possibilities involved 
in enduring suffering. Nietzsche’s task is not to transform compassion and the patho-
logical excesses of this feeling into something that is less harmful and more conducive 
to higher human ends. Rather, his task is to reevaluate and overcome compassion and 
its excessive concern with suffering and with well-being understood hedonically as 
safety and comfort.49
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